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Reading this along with the statement of Cartwright, J., that "the
appellant purchased relaying rail; he did not purchase 'potential relaying rail' or scrap that might be transformed into 'relaying rail'," can it
be inferred that a buyer need not do anything to bring the goods up
to contract standard, however trivial the work might be?
A final question that might be investigated in a more thorough
examination of the Runnymede case is whether or not words of
quality can ever be part of the description of goods in a contract for
the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act? This argument was presented
in the Court of Appeal but no mention was made of it in the judgments. Quality is a matter of degree. At some point a line must be
drawn between the goods on one side of contract quality and the
goods on the other side which are not. The location of this point may
be a very difficult question of fact. Perhaps it would be more conducive to modern business for the law to take no note of words of
quality in descriptions of goods in contracts where a right of rejection
of the goods is involved.
It would seem that the simplest view and the one with the most
certainty-so important an element in commercial law matters-is the
principle enunciated by Lord Low in the Aitken case, that is, that
goods of a "different description" in sec. 29(3) mean goods of a
different "kind". However, the highest court in the land has decided
to extend this principle. Exactly how much they have extended it
seems to be uncertain, but the case does seem to provide another
example of the view that doubt will be resolved in favour of the buyer.
PATRICK J. CULL*

THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS CASE-INTERNATIONAL LAW-UNITED NA-

TIONS CHARTER-ARTICLE 17-In July, 1962, the International Court
of Justice released an advisory opinion under the ambiguous heading
"Certain Expenses of the United Nations"l-an opinion, awaited with
great interest, in the case previously referred to as the SpeciaZ Assessments Case. In the result, the opinion represents the view of the court,
by a majority of 9 judges to 5, that the expenses incurred by the
various U.N. organs in pursuing the operations known as U.N.E.F.
and O.N.U.C. are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning
of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter and are therefore proper
expenses to be dealt with by the General Assembly by way of assessment against the U.N. members.
*Mr.1 Cull is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School
Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

This result was generally acclaimed as being a proper and even
triumphant one-a result which vindicates the action of the Secretary
General and shores up the very foundations of the U.N. Organization.
Indeed, the judges who dissented expressed their regret that they
felt compelled to do so. Judge Moreno Quintana went on to say:
It would have been for me a matter of great satisfaction to contribute
in the exercise of my judicial function to the most effective realization
of the essential purpose of the Organization. 2

Judge Quintana also remarked:
An egalitarian solution, taking the financing of operations mainly based
on military action as being a normal expense of the Organization to be
apportioned among all Members States, seems an attractive one from
the point of view of the cause to be served by the purpose in question.S

And again, Judge Quintana commented that "As an ideological
position, the [view that the expenses in question were expenses of
the Organization] is the most attractive.. .-14 But "It remains to be
seen whether it is correct from the legal point of view." 5
Five judges found themselves unable to give an affirmative answer
to the legal question. Those judges who felt compelled to dissent did
not overlook the extreme significance of the case before them. Of the
problem posed Judge Bustamante said:
We are faced with a situation of uncertainty which cannot be ignored.
The financial crisis which has occurred within the Organization is only
the reflection of6 another crisis the subject of which is the very substance
of the Charter.

Financialcrisis
Indeed, the very fact of the financial crisis was an element in
leading the dissenting judges to insist upon a careful legal decision
of the validity of the resolutions authorizing action and authorizing
the expenditures as a basis for deciding the question actually put to
the Court.
Judge Bustamante said:
A particular and an important aspect of the objectives raised to the
inclusion in Article 17, paragraph 2, of expenditure for the maintenance
of peace is the amount-every day a larger amount-of that expenditure,
in view of the great extension of the armed interventions of the United
Nations to preserve or restore peace.7

Judge Bustamante went on to point out that the enormous expenses of the U.N. sought to be assessed against the Members imposed
on some States a severe test of solvency of their national budgets. He
2 Ibid. 239.
3 Ibid. 240-1.
4 Ibid. 243.
5 Ibid. 243.
6 Ib. 307.
7Ibid. 301; for example, the 1961 assessments for U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C.
amounted to $150,000,000.
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noted that the General Assembly had already recognized this problem
and had taken steps to reduce the incidence of the liability on some
of the less wealthy States.8 But such a stop-gap response by the General Assembly is not sufficient.
Need for charter review
It is clear to me that, at the time of signature of the Charter, none of
the States Members could have foreseen that the obligations which they
acknowledged in respect of the Organization could one day conflict
with their obligations under municipal law vis-&-vis their national communities. Nobody foresaw that the increase in expenditure of the United
Nations could one day endanger the solvency of national budgets. But
since this state of affairs has arisen subsequently to the coming into
force of the Charter, it is obvious that such a new factor calls for very
special consideration by the competent organ of the Organization. The
apportionment of assessments according to the system of budgetary scales
has been the subject of continual criticisms. Some more explicit and
formal compromise between the budgetary necessities of the United
Nations and the constitutional problem of the objecting States must
therefore be arrived at, so as to incorporate in the Charter settlement
9
some further rule covering the new situation.

This comment is typical of Judge Bustamante's judgment. The

need for "consideration by the competent organ" is its theme. Like
the other dissenting members of the Court, Judge Bustamante based
himself on the manner in which the question was framed-the objection being that the question as posed precluded a proper, and indeed
essential, decision on the legality of the resolutions pursuant to which
the expenses were incurred. As a result, the five dissenting judges
found it impossible to give an affirmative answer to the question
posed.
Unlike the others, Judge Bustamante conceded the possibility of a
finding that these resolutions were legal and stood ready to answer
affirmatively to the question actually posed should such a finding be

made by "the competent organ".
An equally emphatic statement of the significance of this advisory
opinion as the one above quoted from the opinion of Judge Bustamante 10 may be found in the judgment of Judge Moreno Quintana.
To say that this new advisory opinion might decide the fate of the
United Nations in the years to come would certainly be rash, but it may
at least be affirmed that its effects would be far-reaching. It relates to
a matter as decisive as that of the financing of the Organization for the
achievement of its purpose of maintaining international peace and
security..

Primarypurposes of the U.N.
The maintenance of peace and security, of course, is a primary
aim of the U.N. Organization as is stated in the opening words of the

8 bid. 302-3. And see the comments of Judge Koretsky pp. 265-7 in which
he outlines briefly the proposals to reduce by as much as 80% the liability to
assessment for the peace keeping expenses of some of the smaller states by
appl ng for the purpose voluntary contributions made by other States.
Per Judge Bustamante, Ibid. p. 302.
1o Supra, p. 540.
11 I.C.J. Reports 1962, 240.
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Charter. 2 The primacy of this purpose in the Charter received comment frequently in the majority and concurring opinions. The
majority opinion said:
.. it is apparent that the operations were undertaken to fulfil a prime
purpose of the United Nations ....
and expenses resulting from such

obligations must be considered "expenses of the Organization within the

meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2".13

Judge Spiropoulos found room in a one page concurring judgment

to approve particularly this view,1 4 and Judge Sir Percy Spender

agreed, with a small wrinkle added. He said, not that expenses incurred in pursuit of a basic aim of the Charter were automatically
"expenses of the Organization", but that such expenses having been
incurred it was up to the General Assembly to determine whether they
were "expenses of the Organization". 15
The end does not justify the means

The rejoinders made by the dissenting judges to this emphasis on
the primary purposes of the U.N. ranged from Judge Koretsky's
criticism of the majority for having accepted, uncritically, the repeated assertions in the various General Assembly resolutions that
the expenses were made pursuant to the "guiding principles" of the
United Nations16 to his comment that limiting itself to the purposes of
the Organization without attention to the necessity for strict observation and proper interpretation of the provisions and rules of the
Charter must lead the Court to "the long ago condemned formula:
'the ends justify the means'."' 7
President Winiarski also denied that the end would justify the
means.
The Charter has set forth the purposes of the United Nations in very
wide, and for that reason too indefinite, terms. But . . . it does not
follow, far from it, that the Organization is entitled to seek to achieve
those purposes by no matter what means. The fact that an organ of
the United Nations is seeking to achieve one of those purposes does not
suffice to render its action lawful. The Charter, a multilateral treaty
which was the result of prolonged and laborious negotiations, carefully
created organs and determined their competence and means of action.1 8
Judge Moreno Quintana expanded this point, asserting that there was
no need to invoke implied powers conceived to achieve the basic
12

Chapter I.

Purposes and Principles.
Article 1.
The purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security ....
13Ibid. 171-2. I.C.J. Reports 1962, 171-2. See also majority opinion, Ibid.
pp. 167-8.
14 Ibid. 180.
15 Ibid. 182. See also Judge Spender's comments on p. 185 and again on p.
186 to the effect that the stated purposes of the Charter are a prime con.
sideration in its interpretation.
16 Ibid. 255.
17
-18Ibid.
Ibid. 268.
230.
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purposes of the Organization "when explicit powers provide expressly
for the eventualities under consideration."'19 This assertion, of course,
is based on his opinion that U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C. were operations
undertaken pursuant to explicit Charter powers, an opinion not shared
by the majority. Thus, one of the most fundamental differences of
opinion between the majority and minority members of the Court
was whether the operations under discussion were "Enforcement
Actions" for which provision is made in Chapter VII of the Charter.
Possibilityof the United Nations being unable to act
President Winiarski considered the separation of fields of
competence so fundamental that it might mean the Organization
would be unable to act at all in certain cases. He stated:
The intention of those who drafted [the Charter] was clearly to
abandon the possibility of useful action rather than to sacrifice the balance
of carefully established fields of competence, as can be seen, for example,
in the case of the voting in the Security Council. It is only by such procedures, which were clearly defined, that the United Nations can seek to
achieve its purposes. It may be that the United Nations is sometimes
not in a position to undertake action which would be useful for the
maintenance of international peace and security or for one or another
of the purposes indicated in Article I of the Charter, but that is the way
in which the organization was conceived and brought into being.2 0
II.

THE SETTING

Charter
Limitations of space preclude any attempt at a full outline of the
Charter provisions and division of functions between the General
Assembly and the Security Council.
Briefly, it may be said that Chapter IV of the Charter gives the
General Assembly general powers of discussion and recommendation
on all matters within the scope of the Charter,2 ' specific powers of
consideration and discussion of questions pertaining to international
peace and security2 2 and power to make recommendations in relation
to such questions, 23 power to initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international co-operation in all fields,24 and powers
to consider reports from the Security Council and other organs of the
United Nations. 25 In addition, the General Assembly is given the
financial responsibility for the Organization. Article 17 gives it the
duty of considering and approving the budget of the Organization,
apportioning the "expenses of the Organization" among the Members, 26 and considering and approving the financial and budgetary
arrangements of any specialized agencies of the United Nations.
19 Ibid. 245.

Ibid. 230.
Article 10.
22 Article 11.
20
21
23

24
2

Article 14.

Article 13.
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Articles 11, 12 and 14 make it clear that in matters involving
international peace the General Assembly shall defer to the primary
competence of the Security Council. In Chapter V the Security
Council is specifically given primary responsibility
for the mainten2
ance of international peace and security. Y
Chapter VII of the Charter is headed "Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." It specifies the powers of the Security Council to deal with such
situations by various means, including the use of force if necessary.
Article 43 empowers the Security Council to conclude special agreements with Member States for the supply of armed forces and other
assistance for the maintenance of peace.
Chapter XV provides for the Secretariat Article 97 constitutes
the Secretary General "the chief administrative officer of the Organization". Article 98 charges him with the responsibility of so acting
at all meetings of the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic
and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council and with the duty
to "perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these
organs."
Factual background
In effect, what happened in the Suez crisis was that the General
Assembly requested the Secretary General to submit "a plan for the
setting up ... of an emergency international United Nations Force
to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities", 28 authorized him
"to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the
cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and
arms into the area"2 9 and, pursuant to the proposals of the Secretary
General, established "a United Nations Command for an Emergency
International Force." 3 0 This was U.N.E.F. In a later series of resolutions, the General Assembly authorized expenditures by the Secretary
General for the operations of U.N.E.F. and sought various ways of
financing them, settling finally on a modified scheme of apportionment
similar to that used for assessing Members' liability for the regular
expenses of the Organization.
In the Congo, action was initially taken by the Security Council
which called upon all States to refrain from action which might
impede the restoration of law and order, called specifically on Belgium
to withdraw its troops, and authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congolese government with the necessary military assistance
to restore national security. When the Security Council reached an
impasse in its attempt to pass a resolution which was opposed, the
General Assembly was called into Emergency Session and, with some
27
28
29

Article 24.
Resolution 998 (ES-1), Nov. 4, 1956.
Resolution 999 (ES-1), Nov. 4, 1956.
30

Resolution 1000 (ES-1), Nov. 5, 1956.
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amendments, passed the desired resolution. The General Assembly
subsequently authorized expenditures up to $10,000,000 per month,31
and again sought the means of financing them.
III. THE PROBLEM
The specific question put to the Court for its advisory opinion
was:
Do the expenditures authorized in [the various General Assembly
resolutions referred to above] constitute 'expenses of the Organization'
within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the
United Nations?
The French delegation had proposed an amendment to the resolution
requesting the opinion. This amendment would have asked the Court
to consider, as a matter preliminary to answering the above question,
whether the expenditures relating to the indicated operation were
decided on in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. The
majority opinion appears to assume that a negative answer to this
preliminary question would have ended the quest and determined that
32
a negative reply must be given to the question actually posed.
It would be possible to move the enquiry a stage further back
again to consider whether the action by which the expenses were
incurred was itself taken in conformity with the Charter. This
question involves a bifurcation of its own-first, was the action validly
authorized, and secondly, was it validly carried out?
In theory at least, this series of enquiries may be viewed as either
conjunctive or disjunctive. It is certainly arguable that the General
Assembly can only authorize expenditures for "legal" actions and
operations and that only those expenses which have been validly
authorized may qualify as "expenses of the Organization". On the
other hand, it is also arguable that the tests stand independently, that
the General Assembly may validly authorize expenditures for operations not "legally" authorized to be undertaken, and that expenses
authorized by the General Assembly will be "expenses of the Organization" notwithstanding that they may not have been validly
authorized.
The first view was taken by the dissenting judges. Though it
may be true, as Judge Moreno Quintana remarked, that the affirmative
is the more attractive position ideologically, it is clearly the case that
adoption of what I call the conjunctive view of the three levels of
enquiry greatly favours those who adopt the negative position. They
need only establish a failure to comply at any one of the three levels.
In fact, they attacked at all three levels. They asserted that the action
was "illegally" authorized inasmuch as the Security Council, not the
31The 1960 assessments for O.N.U.C. amounted to $60,000,000, and The
1961 assessments for O.N.U.C. were $120,000,000.
Together with the assessment for U.N.E.F. the 1961 cost was more than
twice
32 the regular budget of $72,000,000.
See LC.J. Reports 1962, p. 156.
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General Assembly, has responsibility for maintenance of peace; in any
event, it was alleged that the Secretary General exceeded his mandate
in carrying out the action. It was further asserted that the General
Assembly could not validly authorize expenditures so incurred and
that, in fact, its modifications of the scheme of assessment were
political bribery. Finally, it was said that Art. 17 does not contemplate
such expenses, responsibility for which must devolve upon the
Security Council or the States whose conduct necessitated them or
upon the States whose interests were most closely involved. This
argument may also be applied at the second level, i.e., the General
Assembly cannot validly authorize such expenditures.
In contrast, only two of the majority judges adopted the disjunctive test. Judge Sir Percy Spender and Judge Morelli considered that
the General Assembly could make a binding apportionment of the
expenses irrespective of whether they were validly incurred or authorized. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice considered that an expense must
have been validly incurred to rank as an "expense of the Organization"
and, as noted above, 33 the majority opinion apparently assumed that
to qualify, expenses would have to be "decided on in conformity with
the Charter". Judge Spiropoulos considered that he was precluded
from considering this question in view of the rejection of the French
amendment.
In fact, then, the French amendment was defeated in the General
Assembly, but this was not the unqualified boon to the proponents of
the affirmative that one might have expected. There arose the technical question whether, by rejecting the amendment, the General
Assembly had foreclosed the Court from considering the issue of
validity of the resolutions authorizing the expenditures under discussion. There was a variety of inferences on this point The majority
opinion dismissed the suggestion that the General Assembly would
in any way "seek to fetter or hamper the Court in the discharge of
its judicial functions."' 4 Judge Spiropoulos stated quite flatly that
the action of the General Assembly did preclude the Court from examining the validity of the authorizing resolutions.3 5 Judge Sir Percy
Spender considered the question academic as, in his opinion, the
answer to the question actually posed was not thereby affected. He
felt that the Court should not go into matters unnecessary for its purpose and should therefore decline to examine the validity of the
authorizing resolutions. 36 Judge Sir, Gerald Fitzmaurice found such
an examination necessary as he considered that to qualify as an "expense of the Organization" it must first be shown that an expense had
been validly incurred. Judge Morelli agreed with Judge Spender that
an affirmative answer to the question posed did not depend upon the
33 Supra, p. 542.

34 I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 157.
35
Ibid. 181.
36
Ibid. 182.
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conformity to the Charter of the authorizing resolutions.3 7 In any
event, he considered the General Assembly action had precluded the
Court from "deciding" whether those resolutions did conform though
the Court remained free to "consider" the point if it found it necessary in arriving at a decision.
Probably the most significant aspect of the French amendment
and its rejection was that it provided the dissenting judges with the
foundation for a technical objection. Judge Basdevant took the view
that the request for an opinion did not make clear "whether the Court
should purely and simply start from the existence of 'expenditures authorized' or whether it should first of all ascertain whether those expenses were properly authorized by the General Assembly."3 8 For that
reason, he said, the Court was unable to render an opinion as the
request for an opinion must contain "an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required."3 9 Judge Moreno Quintana
agreed that the Court was precluded from examining the validity of
the authorizing resolutions and was therefore effectively prevented
from answering the question put to it.40 Judge Koretsky also considered that the Court was prohibited from examining the authorizing
resolutions. He attacked the manner in which the question was framed
from a different angle, however, saying that the General Assembly had
put a question connected with resolutions already adopted and expenses already effected. He objected to this as calling for "a quasijudicial appraisal of the effected expenses" rather than an answer "in
the form of principle, based on an interpretation of the Charter."''
Judge Basdevant had also objected that the request sought "a retrospective evaluation of what was done up to the end of 1961," rather
than guidance for present and future undertakings. 42 Judge Bustamante's view of the effect of the rejection of the French amendment
was similar to that expressed by Judge Morelli. He thought that the
Court was not prevented from considering any matter relevant to its
reasoning process, but that the "operative part" of its opinion could
43
not include a decision on the validity of the authorizing resolutions.
Judge Bustamante, therefore, did not agree with his dissenting colleagues that the Court should not answer the question posed. He
simply found himself unable to give an affirmative answer to it without a prior finding, by the "competent organ", that those resolutions
were valid.
Another technical objection demanded the attention of the Court
There was raised a preliminary objection to the Court's competence
37 Ibid, 216.

38 Ibid. 235.

39 Wording taken from Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
40 I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 247 and 252.
41
42

Ibid. 254.

Ibid. 238. The majority opinion specifically agreed that the Court is
only asked to answer a question related to certain expenses already made,
but 4did not view this fact with the same alarm-see Ibid. p. 158.
3 Ibid. 288.
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to render an opinion on the basis that the question posed was a
political one, whereas Article 65 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice empowers the Court only to "give an advisory
opinion on any legal question". In any event, it was said, the power
given is discretionary and the question before it was at least so
intertwined with political considerations that the Court should decline
to answer. The majority opinion dismissed this objection, saying:
It is true that most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations
will have political significance, great or small. In the nature of things
it could not be otherwise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a political
character to a request which invites it to undertake an4 4 essentially
judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision.
Judge Koretsky was the only judge who disagreed specifically
with this statement. He considered that the problem was basically
a constitutional one rather than a budgetary one and that "political
issues prevailed over juridical considerations" to such an extent that
the Court should refrain from giving an opinion. 45 Judge Koretsky
also commented on the political manoeuvring in the General Assembly
preliminary to the adoption of some of the resolutions approving
the expenses of U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C. He pointed out that a steadily
increasing number of States had been abstaining from voting on these
resolutions and suggested that the modification by which the assessment of some of the smaller States was reduced by crediting thereto
the voluntary contributions received was introduced in order to, and
did to some extent, influence the voting. This is probably a fair
comment. It is also fair to say, as he did, that the question before
the Court was basically a constitutional one rather than a budgetary
one. This is the implication of the comments on the extreme significance of the case noted at the beginning of this article. However,
that does not determine, necessarily, that the question is political
rather than legal. Constitutional interpretation involves legal questions through, as the majority opinion conceded, it may also involve
political consequences-in this case of great significance.

IV. THE JUDGMENT
Basically, the position taken by the opponents to the inclusion

of the U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C. costs in the "expenses of the Organization" can be stated in one sentence-"Those expenses do not form
part of the regular budget of the Organization; they are expenses
essentially different in nature from the regular expenses and, being

incurred as a result of an enforcement action under Chapter VII of
the Charter, they are the responsibility of the Security Council."

The majority opinion, of course, rejects this statement in all its
implications which are, broadly, four in number.
(1) ReguZar Budget: The argument that the expenses under review

did not form part of the regular budget was dismissed by the
44 Ibid 155.
45 Ibid. 254.
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majority opinion on two grounds. In the first place, the majority
denied that the word "budget" in Article 17, paragraph 1, is to be
qualified by the word "regular" or any similar adjective which would
impliedly exclude operational costs. They contrasted the wording of
paragraph 1 with that of paragraph 3 of Article 17 wherein certain
specific functions are given to the General Assembly in respect of
various administrative budgets. In the second place, the majority
opined that the power in paragraph 2 is, in any event, not limited
by reference to paragraph 1-i.e., in apportioning the "expenses of
the Organization" the General Assembly is not restricted to considering only expenses within the "budget". 46
Both of these contentions were rejected by Judge Koretsky who
was particularly emphatic that paragraph 1 of Article 17 does limit
paragraph 2. In support of his view he cited the discussions and preliminary drafting at San Francisco during the course of which the
order of the two paragraphs was reversed.
(2) Different Nature: The dissenting judges frequently referred
to the fact that the expenses of U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C. were of an
extraordinary nature. Judge Koretsky dealt with this at great
length,47 pointing out that the General Assembly, in its numerous
resolutions concerning these expenses, had consistently recognized
their extraordinary character, and noting that even when the General
Assembly first decided to apportion the expenses it proposed to do
so "in the same manner as" and "in accordance with" the regular
scale of assessments-i.e., an analogy rather than an equation with
the regular expenses of the Organization. It was also pointed out
that a Special Account was set up for these expenses.
The majority said:
the establishment of a Special Account does not necessarily mean that
the funds in it are not be derived from contributions of members as
apportioned by the General Assembly.4 S

They also noted that:
Article 17 is the only one in the Charter which refers to budgetary
authority4 9 or to the power to apportion expenses, or otherwise to raise

revenue;

it accordingly contains the authority to deal with all the expenses-be
they ever so extraordinary.
A particularly interesting commentary on the obligation of
members to contribute was provided by Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
whose opinion on this point it is impossible to do justice in a few
lines. He maintained a strict requirement that the expenses be both,
(1) of the genus "expense" and, (2) validly incurred (conditions met
46 Ibid. 159-162.
47
See Ibid. 260-268 and. p. 280.
4
8 Ibid. 173.
49
Ibid. 162.
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by these expenses, he found).50 He also conceded some difficulty with
respect to costs incurred pursuant to the exercise of permissive powers
as contrasted with the performance of a duty. Basically, however,
his position was that a Member assumes a liability to pay its share
from the very fact of joining the Organization. This obligation is
not created by Article 17, but is a pre-existing one which that Article
simply quantifies (or, more correctly, empowers the General Assembly
to quantify). There is, then, an obligation on all Members to contribute to the cost of essential activities of the Organization, no
matter how extraordinary they may be. He drew two analogies to
private law--one a reference to the right to recover, under a contract
of employment, those expenses which are reasonable and necessary
and have been incurred in the normal course of business-the other
an analogy with the member of a community or of a club who
can be compelled to contribute to the costs incurred by his government or club committee. Like the club member, the Member States
of the United Nations have the alternative of paying their dues or
resigning their membership.
Judge Moreno Quintana denied this viewpoint, indirectly at
least. He conceded the obligation to pay for indispensable expenses,
by which he meant administrative expenses. But
if all the Member States of the United Nations were obliged to
bear burdens over and above the responsibility to which they had committed themselves, then the financial power of the Organization would be
substituted for the national powers of each of its members. It is
established that the United Nations is not a super-state .... 51
Leaving aside the consideration that by the words "over and above
the responsibility to which they had committed themselves" Judge
Quintana was begging the very question to which Judge Fitzmaurice
was providing a possible answer, it will be seen that this statement
denies any analogy to the position of an individual of a community.
This comment leads to a consideration of the "Sovereign Equality" objection. As President Winiarski pointed out, one of the basic
tenets of the Charter is that "the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." 52 Judge Bustamante and President Winiarski both stated that this principle demands close attention to the separation of functions between the
Security Council and the General Assembly. "Decisions" of the
Security Council are binding, they asserted, upon all Member States
(State Sovereignty being surrendered to that extent); "recommendations" of the General Assembly are not. This point involves a
consideration of the argument that the Security Council has sole
responsibility for financing "enforcement actions"---an argument based
on a prior contention that the Security Council has sole authority to
carry out "enforcement actions." This argument was met, by those
50 See particularly Ibid. pp. 202-207.
51
Ibid. 248.
52
Article 2, paragraph 1.
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who sought to uphold the assessments, by a three-point rejoinder.
First, there was no "enforcement action". Secondly, even if there was,
the Security Council does not have the sole competence to pursue
such action. Thirdly, in any event the General Assembly, not the
Security Council, had the responsibility for financing such action.
(3) Enforcement Action: The majority opinion reviewed the facts
and denied that either the U.N.E.F. or the O.N.U.C. operation was
an "enforcement action".5 In contrast, Judge Moreno Quintana's
view of the facts was that
When there have been dead and wounded, bombardments on both sides,
when civilian populations have paid the price, when a cease-fire and other
military agreements have been negotiated between two belligerent
groups, it is not easy to evade the analysis of the question of enforcement by restricting the interpretation to a purely grammatical construction... 54
(4) Authority and Responsibility of the Security Council:
This point actually involves two contentions. For the opponents
to the assessment it was said, first, that the Security Council has
the sole authority and responsibility for enforcement actions, and
secondly, even if that is not so, the Security Council, having primary
authority and responsibility for such actions, has the responsibility
for their financing. The champions of the assessments denied that
the Security Council has sole authority and responsibility for enforcement actions though they did concede that organization's primary
responsibility. Secondly, they said that regardless of who may have
the primary or sole responsibility for the actions, it falls to the
General Assembly to settle the financing.
The basic opposition position was stated briefly by Judge Moreno
Quinana who pointed out that Article 24 of the Charter imposes
on the Security Council a primary responsibility for the maintenance
of peace and security, this being a mandate from the rest of the
Members and one which the permanent Security Council members
can not renounce or revoke.
But such a privilege would seem also to have its counterpart. The
exercise of the right to administer world affairs goes together with the
duty of furnishing the necessary means for the accomplishment of that
duty.SS

Judge Koretsky urged that the responsibility of the Security
Council in this area is not only primary, it is exclusive.
People say that you cannot have two coachmen in the driver's seat. In
the cause of the struggle for international peace and security . . . the
organizational confusion would only have been harmful. Therefore the
Charter clearly enough delimits the functions of the Security Council and
those of the General Assembly.
To place the Security Council, as the Opinion does, beside the General
Assembly, considering them as interchangeable in solving and implement53

See I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 170-1 and p. 177.
541bid. 246.
55
Ibid. 249.
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ing the tasks of maintaining international peace and security, would be
objectively to replace the Security Council by the General Assembly, to
put the Council
aside and thereby undermine the very foundations of the
56
Organization.

Judge Koretsky approved as "the proper way of solving the
problem" of expenses the Ghanian delegation's draft resolution which
proposed to "refer the question immediately to the Security Council
for consideration.15 7
The dissenting judges also relied on the provisions of Article 43
which empowers the Security Council to conclude "agreements" with
individual States for the supply of men, equipment and other assistance. They inferred that this imposes on the Security Council an
obligation to provide, or arrange for, the financing to support any
"agreements" which may be entered into.
The majority opinion rejected the claim of sole responsibility for
the Security Council. It attributed primary responsibility only to
that organ. Rather than the division of functions, the opinion emphasized that "there is a close collaboration between the two organs."' 8
The Opinion stated that the General Assembly is not restricted
to discussion and recommendations. Speaking of the wording of
Article 14, which empowers the General Assembly to "recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment" of situations, the majority
said:
The word 'measures' implies some kind of action, and the only limitation
which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction
found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend
measures while the Security Council is dealing with the same matter
unless the Council requests it to do so.59

The majority also pointed out that Article 18 permits the General
Assembly to make certain "decisions", some of which have dispositive
force and effect-decisions on questions of suspension of membership,
expulsion of members and budgetary questions. The majority dealt
with the question of "action", opining that the sort of action which
is solely within the province of the Security Council is "enforcement
action" of the type contemplated in Chapter VII of the Charter.
It may be seen at this point that the majority position becomes
somewhat tenuous. They were actually conceding to the Security
Council sole authority over enforcement actions, but denying that
U.N.E.C. and O.N.U.C. were actions of that type. It is difficult to
ignore the comments of Judge Moreno Quintana who dismissed the
casuistic attempts to prove that these were not the sort of "enforcement actions" contemplated by the Charter. He insisted that the
facts bespeak eloquently enough of the degree of "enforcement"
which ultimately became necessary.
56 Ibid. 272.
557 Ibid. 282.
8 i.e. the Security Council and the General Assembly: see ibid. 163.
59
Ibid. 163.
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It is also difficult for the majority judges to show what sort of
"action" the General Assembly is authorized to conduct. The "decisions" authorized by Article 18 include decisions on very important
matters, but do not include decisions on enforcement actions. And it
should be noted that even the "measures" mentioned in Article 14
may only be recommended by the General Assembly.
The majority position suffers further from the fact that the
concurring opinions scarcely concerned themselves with these issues.
These matters were not overlooked by the dissenting judges,
however. They particularly emphasized the restriction on General
Assembly powers to "recommendation". President Winiarski commented that it is difficult to see how such a recommendation can be
transformed into a binding obligation. 60 Judge Koretsky also asserted
that if expenses pursuant to a recommendation can lead to an obligatory assessment this amounts to the conversion of a non-mandatory
recommendation into a mandatory decision-a proceeding "against
the Charter, against logic and even against common sense.'"'6 He
emphasized throughout his judgment that such a proceeding diminishes in an unwarranted fashion the role of the Security Council and
extends that of the General Assembly. He denied specifically that
Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to take "action" to
maintain peace. He considered that Article 14 is not concerned with
peace-keeping operations at all. If it did permit the General Assembly
the powers suggested by the majority then Articles 11 and 12, which
carefully define the General Assembly's role in respect of the maintenance of peace and security, would be redundant. 62
Several other somewhat incidental issues arose in the majority
opinion and brought comment from some of the other judges.
Unanimity of Votes: The majority pointed out that many of the
resolutions authorizing the U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C. operations and
their financing were passed without dissent. This point assumed
importance for Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice who conceded the
difficulty of reconciling the non-obligatory nature of the General
Assembly's resolutions 63 with the obligatory character of the
assessment for the expenses. He considered that any objection was
waived by States who voted in favour of the resolutions or who
abstained from voting, but had some doubt about the States who
voted against the resolutions.
Judge Koretsky objected to the inferences drawn by the majority
from the fact of failure to oppose the resolutions. He commented that
the U.S.S.R. delegation abstained from voting against resolutions
6

Obid. 234.

61 Ibi. 287.
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Ibid. 259.
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In contrast with the obligatory nature of the Security Council "decisions"
which, by virtue of Charter Article 25, all Members agree to accept and carry
out.
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whose form it disapproved because it was in sympathy with their
purposes. If, however, abstention is to entail the consequence suggested by Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, then the Soviet delegation
will have to "make another evaluation of abstention from voting." 64
For his part, Judge Fitzmaurice was able to assuage his doubts
by relying on the force of majority vote-a deliberate departure, as
he pointed out, from the procedure under the League of Nations in
which unanimity was required.
But a majority voting rule is meaningless unless, although the States
of the minority are not formally bound as regards their own action, they
at least cannot prevent or impede the action decided on from being
carried out aliunde. This they obviously could do if they had a species of
veto, the exercise of which, through the refusal to contribute financially,
would 6enable
them to prevent or seriously impede the action con5
cerned.

Inference from Subsequent Conduct: The majority opiniori cited
the numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions
in prosecution of the Middle East and Congo operations and denied
that it is possible to impeach those operations "in the light of such
a record of reiterated consideration, confirmation, approval and ratification by the Security Council and by the General Assembly".6 6
Judge Sir Percy Spender, however, in an opinion given over
largely to a discussion of interpretation of treaties with specific
reference to the United Nations Charter, greatly restricted the application of the so-called "Rule of Subsequent Conduct"-a rule of
interpretation which infers from the subsequent conduct of parties
to a treaty what was their intention when they signed. Judge.
Spender pointed out that the rule demands careful application even
to a bilateral treaty; in a case such as the Charter the rule is of
practically no assistance at all.
President Winiarski also disputed that subsequent practice has
any inferential value; in any event, he said, the subsequent practice
was not uniformly consistent with the view of the majority.67
Even Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who displayed some sympathy with the principle of subsequent conduct, remarked that it
has little force in the present circumstances. He reminded the
Court that Members are at all times free to make voluntary contributions though not recognizing any obligation to do so. In his
view, the proper inference is that many payments have been made
simply because. Members were "unwilling in the last resort to
withhold a contribution." 68
64 I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 260; see also pp. 278-9.
65 Ibid. 211-2.
66
Ibid. 176; see generally pp. 174-7.
67
Ibid. 230-2.
6SIbid. 201.

1963]

Case Comment

Each. OrganizationJudge of its own Competence:
The majority opinion asserted that even if the Middle East and
Congo operations were undertaken by the wrong organ this would
mean it was irregular as a matter of internal structure but not necessarily that the expenses incurred are not "expenses of the Organization". The Opinion then pointed out the absence of an ultimate
authority to interpret the Charter and acts taken under it.
In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for
determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no
analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United
Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place
ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court
of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course
of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, each organ
must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.6 9
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice sympathized with this view only
so far as to agree that the fact that the expenses, incurred in apparent
furtherance of the purposes of the Organization, have been placed
on the agenda, gone through the usual procedural stages and been
approved by a two-thirds majority raises a "strong prima facie presumption" that they are valid and proper.7 0 He also agreed that each
organ is the judge of its own competence in the first instance in
the sense that the objection must be first raised in the organ. He
considered that a ruling made by the organ could not, however,
validate an invalid act. To uphold that view, he said, would be to
assert that the General Assembly, by deciding to spend money, could
perform functions wholly outside its function-perhaps beyond the
scope of the Organization itself. 1 This objection, of course, was
met by the majority insistence that only expenses which are related
to the Charter purposes could be "expenses of the United Nations."
Judge Fitzmaurice also denied the applicability of the concept
of "internal irregularity". The majority had remarked that "both
national and international law contemplate cases in which the body
corporate or politic may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra
vires act of an agent. ' 72 Judge Fitzmaurice conceded the correctness
of this comment where third parties are concerned, "but what is
really in question here is the relationship of the Member States
inter se, and vis-&-vis the Organizations as such...,,.73
President Winiarski revealed that the fact that there is no
ultimate authority vested in some organ cuts both ways. It is for the
very reason that no tribunal is competent to make a finding of nullity
that the task of objecting to competence must fall upon individual
StatesY4 This, somehow, seems to lend an element of righteousness
to the objections taken.
69 Ibid 168.

70 Ibid. 204.
71 Ibid. 203.

72 Ibid. 168.

73 Ibid. 200.
74 Ibid. 232.
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Judge Bustamante did not agree that there is no authority to
determine competence. He conceded the presumption that all organs
are careful to remain within their competence. However, to deny
that the resolutions of any organ are not subject to review "would
amount to declaring the pointlessness of the Charter or its absolute
subordination to the judgment-always fallible-of the organs".
Accordingly, he thought that objections must be considered by
the implication of Article
the Organization itself. He thought this
75
96 which provides for advisory opinions.
The Opinions of Judges Moreai and Bustamante:
With a majority opinion, four concurring opinions, and five
dissenting ones to consider it is no easy task to determine exactly
what the advisory opinion of the Court really does stand for. Many
of the points raised by the majority were not considered, or were
limited, by the judges who concurred. The dissenting judges were
somewhat more consistent, but their opinions were still far from
uniform. The two most compelling opinions, I think, are those
written by Judges Morelli and Bustamante. Both were rather moderate in their view and their opinions have a good deal in common
though they also differ on an essential matter.
Judge Morelli conceded the necessity, in determining whether
an expenditure qualifies as an "expense of the Organization" of
ascertaining the validity of its approval by the General Assembly. He
then considered at some length the concept of validity-pointing out,
first of all, the dual requirements which face any set of rules to
determine validity. There is a requirement that acts be "legal," i.e.,
conform to whatever the rule requires. There is also a requirement
of "certainty"-a requirement which is jeopardized by an extreme
elevation of the importance of the requirement of "legality", and
which is destroyed if objections to "legality" are at all times open.
Judge Morelli then observed that in municipal law non-conformity of
an act to the rule may entail either a "mere irregularity" or an
"invalidity", which latter, in turn, may result in either "absolute
nullity" or "voidability". Voidable acts, of course, are legal and
binding until avoided according to the prescribed remedies. Avoidance becomes impossible if these remedies are not exercised within
the prescribed times or if the competent supervisory organ declines
to recognize the defect. So is the requirement of "certainty" supported in municipal law.
In the case of the United Nations Judge Morelli noted, the
situation is quite different. As there is no "competent tribunal"
and no machinery for "avoidance", there is no room for a category
of "voidable" acts.
75 Ibid. 304.
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An act must necessarily be either "valid" (although perhaps
irregular) or an "absolute nullity". As the same need for certainty
dictates that the incidence of absolute nullities be kept to a minimum,
the result, according to Judge Morelli, is that the rules of conformity
of acts for an international organization such as the United Nations
must be substantially less strict than in municipal law.
I
It is only in especially serious cases that an act of the Organization
could be regarded as invalid, and hence an absolute nullity.76
This, as Judge Morelli remarked, is similar to saying that each
organ of the United Nations is the judge of its own competence.
He went on to say that, though the General Assembly cannot
act arbitrarily, it is empowered to consider the resolutions authorizing action as one of the factual elements in deciding whether to
approve and assess the expenses incurred, and its decision based on
those factual elements will be final. It is important to note that this
finality is a limited sort of finality. The General Assembly is not
supervising the earlier resolutions. Its decisions on those are final
only in the sense that the authorization of expenditure is final.
Judge Morelli's opinion, then, was that the resolutions authorizing action need not be examined by the Court as to their validity and
the resolutions authorizing the expenses were valid. Ergo the costs
of U.N.E.F. and O.N.U.C. are "expenses of the Organization". This,
apparently, is the sort of "transformation" of non-mandatory General
Assembly recommendations into mandatory assessments against
which President Winiarski and Judge Koretsky inveighed. 78
As mentioned, Judge Bustamante's opinion is moderate. He
stands out from the rest of the dissenting judges by reason of the
paucity of actual objections which he raises. Judge Moreno Quintana's comment may be recalled to the effect that the Security Council
has a mandate from the United Nations Members to administer
world affairs-a mandate which it can not renounce. 79 Judge Bustamante said that, while the Security Council cannot delegate its
functions and upset the "spheres of competence" laid down by the
Charter, it can, in extreme circumstances, and did, return its mandate to the Organization which gave it. In the case of U.N.E.F. the
extreme circumstances arose because two of the permanent Members
of the Council were incapacitated by reason of their involvement in
the conflict.8 0
Judge Bustamante felt that the discussion of Article 43 raises
two questions-one of fact and one of law. As a matter of law, he
considered that Article 43 does not impose an imperative duty to
deal with threats to international peace by means of "special agree76 Ibid. 223; see, generally pp. 221-4.
77Ibid.
224-6.
78
s upra, p. 452.
79 Supra, p. 451.
80 LC.J. Reports 1962, p. 292.
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ments". On the facts, however, he considered that U.N.E.F. and
O.N.U.C. were, at least in part, conducted pursuant to such agreements. He speculated whether the costs of operations pursuant to
those agreements should be borne by,
(a) the States called upon in the agreements, to act; or
(b) those States and the Organization together; or
(c) the Organization alone.
He concluded in favour of solution (b) and thought that the portion
to be borne by the Organization would, in principle, constitute an
"expense of the Organization". 8 '
Judge Bustamante was quite prepared to say that:
in principle... it may be affirmed that the expenses incurred by armed
actions legally undertaken for the maintenance of peace are expenses of
the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2.82

However, the theme of his entire opinion was that there is required
a decision by some "competent organ" that these were, indeed, expenses "legally undertaken" etc. For it is on this essential point
that he had to differ from Judge Morelli. There was quoted earlier

Judge Bustamante's comment that to deny that all resolutions are
83
subject to review would negate the Charter's value.

Dealing specifically with Judge Morelli's reasoning he said:
it has been said that the General Assembly's resolutions regarding
the commitment of resources for the operations in the Middle East and
in the Congo or the financing of operational expenditures ("derived"
resolutions) are themselves independent and ought not to be considered
as depending on the basic resolutions which authorize military operations.
Each organ of the United Nations-it is said-is the judge of its own
competence; and the financial resolutions of the Assembly have, in themselves a binding force which proceeds from the authority and the judgment of this organ, independently of the connection with the basic
resolutions. A legal defect of any kind which might affect these last
resolutions would not, therefore, communicate its defect to the financial
resolutions of the Assembly. I do not agree with this view. One cannot
demolish by this type of reasoning the substantial and objective connection of cause and effect between the resolution authorizing armed
action and a resolution providing for funds to cover the expenditure
involved. The legitimacy of the Assembly's competence to fulfil its duty
of financing the Organization's expenses is one thing; whether the purpose of the expenses and the method of financing are or are not in conformity with the Charter is a very different matter. An examination of
this latter question is in my opinion permissible with regard to all types
of resolution. Moreover, some of the objections raised cover, not only the
basic resolutions but also in a direct fashion those of a financial nature,
with regard to
the apportionment of the burden of the expenses among
all the States.3 4
81

See, generally, Ibid. 298-301.
303.
83 Supra,p. 556.
84 LC.J. Reports 1962, p. 306.
82 Ibid.
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THE ANALYIS: TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY?
How the Great Democracies
Triumphed,
and so
were able to Resume
the follies
Which Had so Nearly
Cost them Their
Life
The Theme of: Triumph, and Tragedy

Winston S. Churchill
It may be that the above subtitle is unnecessarily and shamelessly pretentious. It may develop that the advisory opinion rendered
in the "Special Assessments" case is neither a triumph nor a tragedy.
It may prove just another faltering step along the long road to international harmony and understanding. But it is tempting to apply
pretentious terms to the case because, from present perspective,
its significance looms very large indeed. It was not exaggeration
when Judges Moreno Quintana and Bustamante stated that the
question involved was as basic as the very substance and purpose
of the United Nations Charter. Judge Quintana also said of the
advisory opinion:
The exercise of the Court's advisory jurisdiction which derives from

Article 96 of the Charter and from Article 65 of the Statute of the
Court ... is growing from year to year. It may soon perhaps become
more important than the Court's jurisdiction in contentious proceedings,
which does not always satisfy the aspirations of those who would have
preferred the tribunal with international jurisdiction to be established on

other bases. 85
This is apparently a reference to the rather frustrating position
occupied by the Court in respect of ordinary international disputes.
In these cases the Court has jurisdiction only if they are referred
to the Court by the parties. 8 6 Apart from those arising from treaties
according to whose terms the parties have agreed to submit all
disputes to the Court, very few international disputes are referred
to the Court. Once the contention has arisen, only the party which
anticipates a decision in its favour is desirous of having recourse to

the Court.
Article 96 of the United Nations Charter, however, permits any
United Nations organ to request an advisory opinion from the
Court.87 In this way, majority opinion is able to overcome the
85
8 Ibid. 240.

6 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36, paragraph 1.
S7 Quare, in passing, the force of an advisory opinion. It is generally
thought to be, as the terminology implies, of moral and persuasive force
only. Article 94 of the Charter imposes on all Members on obligation to
comply with the "decision" of the International Court of Justice in any case
to which they are "parties". The Security Council is authorized to decide
upon measures to guarantee the observance of these obligations. Even
if, as seems likely, this Article does not apply to advisory opinions such
opinions are not to be denigrated for having persuasive force solely. The
[FooTIT
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objections of those who fear an unfavourable decislbn. Jockeying
should be eliminated.
Surely it would be tragic, then, if this Opinion should come to
represent nothing more than the same sort of political manoeuvering.
It has been hailed as a triumph for the cause of peace-a reaffirmation
that the United Nations is not helpless in situations of peril to
international security. The Organization can not only take decisive
action, it said, -but it can also call upon all Members to contribute to
the costs of financing such action.
What sort of triumph will it be if the dissident Members
withdraw from the "Club"-the recourse suggested by Judge Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice--or if the General Assembly is compelled to act
to suspend the privileges of membership? Perhaps this would still
be a triumph of sorts so long as the affirmative position of the
majority could be insisted upon as being an undeniably correct and
proper view. Unfortunately, it does not seem to me to be possible
to so insist.
Newspaper comment at the time of publication of the opinion
included the sorrowful reflection that the five dissenting votes included those of the French, Soviet Union and Polish judges-a circumstance, it was said, that smacked more of political considerations
than of coincidence ss For his part, Judge Koretsky disapproved the
General Assembly financing proposals as political manoeuvering designed to gain voting support. Inevitably, power politics has reared
its head throughout and the majority position will find it difficult
to avoid the same stigma.
Whatever the reasons given for judgment, it is hard to resist
the accusation that the majority Opinion diminishes the role of the
Security Council. It is hard to resist the inference that those States
who espouse this viewpoint, dissatisfied with the restrictive procedures of the Security Council, are seeking a political gambit.
Especially are these inferences difficult to resist when the request is
framed, or interpreted, to exclude all consideration of the actual
validity of the action taken and to include only a narrowly legalistic
question.
At the very least, this extremely important issue merits, as
proposed by Judge Bustamante, a consideration by a "competent
organ" of the validity of the action taken and the authorization of
financing therefor.
JAMES A. RENDALL*
Statute of the Court, though it empowers the Court to "decide" issues between
States, is almost silent about the sanctions which may be applied. Article 61,
paragraph 3, authorizes the Court to require compliance with the terms of
its judgment before admitting proceedings in revision.
88
See, for example, editorial comment of the Toronto Globe and Mail,
July 23, 1962.
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